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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyze whether “common currency” countries  n that is, dollarized and
independent currency union countries  n have outperformed countries that have a currency of their
own. The paper is empirical and estimates jointly the probability of being a common currency
country and “outcome” equations for growth, volatility and inflation. We find that both type of
common currency countries have lower inflation than countries with a domestic currency. Dollarized
countries have lower growth and higher volatility than countries with a domestic currency. Currency
unions, on the other hand, have higher growth and higher volatility than countries with a currency
of their own.
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“…almost all independent countries choose to  
assert their nationality by having, to their own 
 inconvenience and that of their neighbors,  
a peculiar currency of their own...”      
 
John Stuart Mill 
Principles of Political Economy, 1848 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The recurrence of currency crises in emerging countries has generated an intense 
debate on exchange rate policies.  Pegged-but-adjustable exchange rate regimes have 
rapidly lost adepts, while hard pegs and freely floating rates have gained in popularity 
(See Summers 2000 and Fischer, 2001). Recently, a number of economists have gone as 
far as arguing that (many) emerging nations should completely give up their national 
currencies, and join a currency union.
1   
In principle, currency unions can take two forms.  First, a country may adopt 
another nation’s currency as its own.  When the other nation is an advanced country this 
monetary arrangement has come to be known by the general name of “dollarization.”
 2  
Under “dollarization” the country in question completely gives up monetary 
independence, and monetary policy is run by the advanced nation’s central bank. 
Countries can “dollarize” in a unilateral fashion – in which case they will loose the 
revenue from seignorage --, or they can sign a monetary treaty with the advanced country 
and share seignorage.
3  Under the second type of currency union, a group of countries 
creates a new currency that is common to the group.
 4  Under this option, monetary policy 
is run by a common central bank, the members of the currency union share seinorage, and 
the common currency’s exchange rate may float relative to other currencies. In the rest of 
this paper we will refer to this type of monetary regime as an “independent currency 
                                                           
1  See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) for a discussion on the conditions under which emerging 
countries will benefit from giving up their currency. 
2  Although this option is known as “dollarization” the advanced country’s currency needs not be the dollar.  
It could be any other “convertible” currency. 
3 In early 2000 then Florida’s senior senator Connie Mack introduced legislation into the U.S. Senate aimed 
at sharing seignorage with countries that decided to adopt the U.S. dollar as legal tender.  The bill, 
however, did not move in the legislative process. 
4 The Euro is, perhaps, the best-known example of this type of currency union.    2
union” or ICU.
 5  Panama and Monaco are good examples of dollarized countries. The 
East Caribbean Currency Area (ECCA) and the Communante Financiere de l’Afrique 
(CFA) , on the other hand, are good representatives of what we have called an 
independent currency union. 
Recently, some emerging countries have decided to give up their currencies and 
officially dollarize their economies.  In 2000, for example, and in the midst of a major 
crisis, Ecuador gave up its currency, the Sucre, and adopted the U.S. dollar.  El Salvador 
adopted the dollar during 2001; and in May 2001, the dollar became legal tender in 
Guatemala. In other countries, however, politicians have systematically refused to 
consider dollarization, even in the face of major and costly financial crises.  This was the 
case of Argentina, for instance, during late 2001 and early 2002. 
A number of authors have argued that countries – and in particular, emerging 
countries -- that give up their currency will tend to outperform countries with a currency 
of their own.  According to this view, not having a domestic currency will have two 
major positive effects on economic performance: First, inflation will be lower in common 
currency countries than in nations with their own currency. Alesina and Barro (2001 p. 
382), for instance, have argued that adopting an advanced nation’s currency “eliminates 
the inflation-bias problem of discretionary monetary policy.”  Second, according to this 
view, countries that give up their currency will tend to grow faster than countries with a 
domestic currency.  This growth effect is supposed to take place through two channels:  
(a) A common currency will tend to result in lower interest rates, higher investment and 
faster growth (Dornbusch 2001).  And (b), by eliminating exchange rate volatility, a 
common currency is supposed to encourage international trade; this, in turn, will result in 
faster growth.  Rose (2000), and Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), among others, have 
emphasized this trade channel.
 6 Other authors, however, have voiced skepticism 
regarding the alleged benefits of “common currency” regimes. According to an 
alternative view that goes back at least to Meade (1950), countries with a hard peg will 
                                                           
5  Strictly speaking there is a third type of currency union:  when a small country adopts a non-convertible 
currency from another country as legal tender.  In this case the “credibility” effect of having monetary 
policy run by an advanced nation’s central bank will not be present.  Thus, in the empirical analysis that 
follows we group this third category with what we have called independent currency unions. 
6   On analytical aspects of dollarization see Calvo (1999) and Eichengreen and Haussman (1999);  for an 
interesting theoretical analysis see Cooper and Kempf (2001).   3
have difficulties accommodating external shocks, including terms of trade and world 
interest rate disturbances. This, in turn, will be translated into greater instability and, 
under some circumstances, will lead to lower economic growth (Fischer 1976; Parrado 
and Velasco 2002). Frankel (1999) has taken a more nuanced view, and has argued that 
there is no unique recipe on exchange rate policy; while some countries will benefit from 
hard pegs, for other countries a floating regime will be more appropriate. And according 
to Eichengreen (2001) the evidence on the relationship between monetary regimes and 
growth is inconclusive, and does not support the claim that dollarization – or any 
exchange rate regime, for that matter – is an important determinant of growth. 
Surprisingly, until recently there have been very few formal empirical studies on 
the economic consequences of common currencies. In particular, international 
comparative studies on alternative exchange rate and monetary regimes have traditionally 
ignored common currency countries.  For instance, the comprehensive study on exchange 
rate regimes, growth and inflation by Gosh et al (1995), does not include nations that do 
not have a currency of their own.  Likewise, the IMF (1997) study on alternative 
exchange rate systems excludes common currency countries, and the recent paper by 
Levy-Yeyeti and Sturzenegger (2001) on exchange rates and economic performance 
excludes nations that do not have a central bank of their own.  This lack of empirical 
evidence means that countries that are contemplating giving up their currency have very 
little information on how other countries have historically performed under this monetary 
regime.  Most existing evidence on dollarization is based on the experience of a single 
country: Panama, which has used the U.S. dollar as legal tender since 1904.
7   
Recently, Andrew Rose and a series of collaborators have analyzed in great detail 
the effects of common currencies on the volume of international trade – see, for instance, 
Rose (2000), Engel and Rose (2002), and Frankel and Rose (2002).  This interesting and 
increasingly influential research has concluded that, with other things given, countries 
with a common currency tend to trade among themselves more intensively than countries 
                                                           
7  Goldfjan and Olivares (2001) use econometrics to evaluate Panama’s experience with dollarization.  
Moreno-Villalaz (1999) provides a detailed analysis of the Panamanian system.  Bogetic (2000) describes 
several aspects of dollarization in a number of countries.  As far as we know, Rose and Engel (2000) and 
Edwards (2001) are the first two papers to provide a statistical and econometric analysis of economic 
performance in dollarized countries and/or currency unions.  See also the papers in Levy_Yeyati and 
Stuzenegger (2003).   4
that have a domestic currency.  These analyses, however, do not make a distinction 
between the two types of “common currency” regimes discussed above: strictly 
dollarized and independent currency unions (ICU).  For instance, an inspection of the 
data sets used by Engel and Rose (2002) and Frankel and Rose (2002) indicates that they 
treat dollarized and ICU nations as a homogeneous group.  Moreover, their sample is 
tilted towards ICU countries, and has relatively few observations on strictly dollarized 
nations.   From a policy perspective, however, it is important to make a distinction 
between these two common currency regimes.  The reason for this is that the two regimes 
have important differences in terms of independence of monetary policy, seignorage, and 
capacity to absorb external shocks.  Making a distinction between dollarized and ICU 
countries is also important from a political economy point of view.  As Frieden (2003) 
has argued, adopting another country’s currency is usually perceived as giving up 
sovereignty, and has serious political costs.  These political costs may be reduced, 
however, if the country becomes a partner in an ICU.  It is even possible that by joining 
an ICU the country reaps most of the benefits of a common currency, without incurring in 
the political costs associated with this measure. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether common currency countries – 
both dollarized and ICU countries – have outperformed countries that have a currency of 
their own. The paper is empirical and proceeds in steps:  we first analyze the behavior of 
all common currency countries, and compare them with countries with domestic 
currencies; we then turn to a comparison of the dollarized and ICU countries. Performing 
these type of international comparisons, however, is not easy.  The problem is how to 
define an appropriate “control” group with which to compare the common currency 
nations.  Since the adoption of a common currency is not a “natural experiment,” using a 
broad control group of all countries with a domestic currency is likely to result in biased 
estimates.  In this paper we tackle this issue by using a treatment effects model that 
estimates jointly the probability of being a common currency country, and outcome 
equations for GDP growth, inflation and volatility (Maddala, 1983; Heckman et. al. 1997; 
Green, 2000; Wooldridge 2002).  Some authors – most notably Alesina and Barro (2001, 
2000) – have analyzed the conditions under which a (small) economy would benefit from 
giving up its currency.  In contrast, we are interested in finding out how countries with a   5
long experience with a common currency regime have performed, relative to countries 
with a currency of their own.     
Before proceeding, it is useful to point out the ways in which our analysis differs 
from other related work in this general area. First, we have made an effort to include data 
on both dollarized and ICU countries.  This has not been easy, as most strictly dollarized 
countries are very small and their data are not included in readily available data sets.  
After significant effort we were able to obtain data on GDP per capita growth and 
inflation for 20 strictly dollarized countries.  We also use data on 32 countries that are 
members of an independent currency union.  Our data set, then, is significantly more 
general than the data set used by other researchers.  Second, we focus directly on the 
most important macroeconomic variables – real GDP per capita growth, inflation and 
growth volatility.  Other studies, in contrast, have analyzed performance in an indirect 
fashion, and have focused on ancillary variables such as the level of international trade 
and/or interest rates. For instance, Edwards (1999), and Powel and Sturzenegger (2003) 
have investigated the way in which the exchange rate/monetary regime affects interest 
rate behavior, and the cost of capital.  On the other hand, Frankel and Rose (2002) have 
analyzed the way in which currency unions affect bilateral trade and, through this 
channel, economic growth.
8  Third, we use a “treatment effects model” to estimate the 
way in which dollarization affects the macroeconomic variables of interest.  And fourth, 
we make a distinction between strictly dollarized and ICU countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we provide a 
preliminary analysis of historical experiences with “common currencies.” In Section III 
we use treatment regressions to analyze the effects of “common currencies” on a group of 
macroeconomic variables.  In Section IV we go a step further and disaggregate the 
common currency countries into strictly dollarized and ICU countries.  In Section V we 
undertake a robustness analysis, and we analyze how different samples and estimation 
techniques affect the results.  In particular, we report results on comparative performance 
obtained from an analysis that uses “matching estimators” techniques, and from using an 
                                                           
8   See Klein (2002) for a discussion on dollarization and trade, including a comprehensive bibliography on 
the subject.   6
instrumental variables version of treatment regressions.  Finally in Section VI we provide 
some concluding remarks. 
II.  Common Currency Experiences During 1970-1998:  A Preliminary Analysis 
II.1 Some Background Discussion 
Table 1 presents a list of 52 common currency countries and territories with 
available data for the period 1970-1998.
9  In compiling this list we have excluded 
countries that, while having a currency of their own, have had a long tradition of fixed 
exchange rates, such as Ireland before 1979 and Bermuda.
10  We have divided our sample 
into two groups:  (a) countries that use and advanced country currency as legal tender, or 
“strictly dollarized countries.”  In our sample 20 countries satisfy this criterion.  (b) Other 
common currency countries, which we call ICUs.  The majority of the ICUs use a 
currency that is common to the area, but is not issued by any of the individual countries.  
Five of them, however, use the currency of another emerging country as legal tender.  It 
is important to note that our data set is much larger than that used by other studies.  For 
instance, in the influential studies by Engel and Rose (2002) and Frankel and Rose (2002) 
there are only 26 counties that have data on real GDP per capita.  Of these, only seven 
use another nation’s currency, and only two -- Panama and Puerto Rico -- use a 
convertible currency as legal tender and are, thus, “strictly dollarized.” 
The countries and territories that have had a strictly dollarized monetary system 
are very small indeed. Many are city-states well integrated into their neighbors’ 
economies – Monaco, Lichtestein, and Andorra are good examples. The largest strictly 
dollarized countries are Liberia, Panama and Puerto Rico. However, only Panama and 
Puerto Rico remain dollarized today; Liberia abandoned the system in the 1980s, when 
the government of President Samuel Doe decided to issue local currency as a way of 
                                                           
9  These countries have data for a long enough period for at least one of two variables: GDP per capita or 
inflation.  In the rest of the paper we will use the term “countries” to refer both to independent countries 
and to territories. 
10   Engel and Rose (2002), in contrast, consider both Ireland and Bermuda as “common currency 
countries.”  Ireland’s currency is the Irish Pound or “punt.”  From September 1928 through March 1979 it 
was linked to the British Pound at parity.  Bermuda’s currency is the Bermuda Dollar.  The Bermuda 
Monetary Authority issues BD$ notes in several denominations (BD$ 2, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100).  The BD$ 
is linked to the U.S. Dollar at parity.  It should be noticed that if these countries are added to the list of 
common currency countries in Table 2, the results reported in this paper remain basically unaffected.   7
avoiding the constraints imposed by the dollarized system.
11  An important characteristic 
of many strictly dollarized economies is that they are extremely open.  In most of them 
there are no controls on capital mobility or on any type of international financial 
transactions.  So much so, that in 2001 six out of the thirteen independent dollarized 
nations were in the OECD list of “Unfair Tax Havens,” or countries whose lax financial 
regulations, according to the OECD, allow individuals and corporations to evade taxes.  
Many “dollarized” territories in Table 1 – French Guyana, Martinique, for example -- 
have extremely close economic links with the “home country,” including labor mobility, 
and free trade both in goods and in financial claims. These characteristics of the 
dollarized economies – very small and extremely open –suggest that using a broad 
control group of all non-dollarized countries, which are much larger and not as open, 
may indeed generate biased results.
12   
The independent currency union (ICU) countries included in our sample are larger 
than the dollarized nations. These ICU nations have a common central bank that, in 
principle, can engage in independent monetary policy.  The two most important currency 
unions in Table 1 currently have a pegged exchange rate relative to a convertible 
currency: the ECCA has had a fixed exchange rate with respect to the US dollar since 
1975.  The CFA franc, on the other hand, was pegged to the French franc at the time of 
its inception in 1948.  In January 1994 the CFA franc was devalued, and re-pegged with 
respect to the Franc, and in January 1999, when the Euro was launched, the CFA franc 
became pegged to the Euro. Notice that only a handful of countries in Table 1 have 
adopted a “common currency” monetary regime within the timeframe of our sample. This 
means that it is not possible to undertake a diffs-in-diffs analysis. 
II.2 Unconditional and “Unadjusted” Comparative Analysis:  1970-1998 
In Table 2 we present comparative data on inflation, per capita GDP growth, and 
the standard deviation of growth for our common currency countries.
13  In order to put 
                                                           
11   It is not easy to date unequivocally Liberia’s abandonment of the dollarized system.  In July 1974 the 
National Bank of Liberia (NBL) was opened.  In 1982 the NBL began issuing five-dollar coins, and in 
1989 it began issuing five-dollar notes.  On Liberia’s dollarization experience see Barret (1995) and 
Berkeley (1993). 
12   The median population of all non-dollarized emerging nations is over 100 times larger than that of the 
dollarized economies. 
13   Our volatility measure is the standard deviation of growth, calculated over a five year period.  When 
alterative time frames were used (i.e. seven years) the results did not change in any significant way.   8
things in perspective we also present data on these three variables for an “unadjusted” 
control group that includes all countries with a currency of their own.  The Table contains 
three panels:  Panel A includes data on all 52 common currency countries; Panel B 
contains data on the  “strictly dollarized” countries, or countries that have adopted a 
convertible currency.  Finally, in Panel C we have included the independent currency 
union countries.  In each panel we include data on the mean and median for the three 
“outcome” macroeconomic variables. In Column (C) we present data on mean and 
median differences between the common currency countries and the “with currency” 
control group.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for the significance of these 
differences.  The test for the means differences is a standard t-statistic, while the medians 
differences test is a t-test obtained using a bootstrapping procedure.  In making the 
computations for inflation differentials we have followed Rose and Engel (2002) and 
have excluded countries with hyperinflations.
14  However, excluding these observations 
only affects the calculation of the means difference (quantitatively, but not qualitatively); 
it has no discernible effect on the computation of median differences. 
The results reported in this table indicate that the difference in inflation means is 
quite sizable and statistically significant; on average, inflation in common currency 
countries as a group (Panel A) has been 9 percentage points lower than in countries with 
their own currency.
15   The difference in inflation medians is also negative, much smaller 
(- 3.7 percentage points), and still statistically significant.  These results also show that 
the rate of inflation in the strictly dollarized countries (Panel B) has been almost one half 
that of the ICUs (Panel C).  In the latter group, however, inflation has still been 
significantly lower than in countries in the control group.   
In terms of real per capita GDP growth, the unadjusted comparisons in Table 2 
show that there are no significant differences in the means across any of the two common 
currency groups and the control group.  The results also indicate, however, that the 
medians difference are significantly negative:  the median rate of growth in the two 
common currency groups have been significantly lower – in a statistical sense – than in 
                                                           
14  More specifically, we excluded from the control group those observations with a rate of inflation in 
excess of 200% per year.  This resulted in 80 observations being dropped from the control group of 
countries with a currency of their own.  See Section IV for results under alternative definitions of “high 
inflation.”   9
the control group of countries with a currency of their own.  Finally, our results show that 
both groups of common currency countries have experienced greater growth volatility 
than the control group: both means and medians differences are significantly positive.   
Although the comparisons reported in Table 2 are informative, they are subject to 
two potential limitations.  First, these are unconditional comparisons, as no effort has 
been made to control for other factors potentially affecting macroeconomic performance; 
second, the control group may not be the appropriate one.  If this is the case, the results 
presented in Table 2 may be subject to a “treatment bias.”
16   We address both of these 
problems in the econometric analysis reported in Sections III through V of this paper. 
III.  Common Currencies and Macroeconomic Performance 
We are interested in investigating whether countries with a “common currency” 
regime have had a “better” macroeconomic performance than countries with a currency 
of their own.  We focus on three dimensions of performance: GDP per capita growth, 
inflation and growth volatility.  In principle, the exchange rate regime will affect the 
growth process – both the first and second moments -- through three potential channels.  
First, a lower cost of capital – usually associated with “hard peg” economies --, will 
result in a higher rate of physical capital accumulation and a higher rate of growth of 
potential output.  Second, a high level of international trade – which, as Rose and his 
coauthors have persuasively shown, is associated with common currency regimes – is 
likely to have a positive effect on TFP growth, and on the rate of growth of potential 
output.  This effect has been emphasized in a number of endogenous growth models, and 
operates through the effect of openness on the accumulation of knowledge.  And third, 
since the exchange rate regime will affect the country’s ability to accommodate external 
terms of trade shocks, it will affect growth volatility and, possibly, average growth.  
Indeed, if as Meade (1950) and Corden (2002), among others, have argued, countries 
with a hard peg – and in particular countries with a “common currency”-- have more 
difficulties accommodating external disturbances, they will tend to exhibit a more volatile 
rate of growth than countries with a domestic currency.  The relationship between 
“common currencies” and inflation is rather straightforward.  A “strictly dollarized” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15   When hyperinflation countries are not excluded the means difference in inflation is a staggering 62%. 
16   See Maddala (1983).   10
system will tend to solve the inflationary bias associated with discretionary monetary 
policy, allowing a small country to share the anchor country’s rate of inflation.  A 
number of studies on Panama – the strictly dollarized country par excellence – provide 
support for this view.  Indeed, Panama’s mean rate of inflation for 1970-1997 was 3.4% 
per year; the median rate during this period was 1.9%.  Neither of these figures is 
significantly different from US inflation during that period.   As Alesina and Barro 
(2000) have argued, the discretionary inflation bias will only be eliminated if the local 
currency is (perceived to be) linked irrevocably to the anchor currency, and will tend to 
have a significantly lower rate of inflation than countries with a currency of their own. 
III.1   The Empirical Model 
Our main interest is to undertake a comparative analysis on the conditional effect 
of a “common currency” on macroeconomic performance. In order to do this, we 
estimate jointly an “outcome equation” and the probability of being a common currency 
country.  As in the preceding section we consider three outcome variables: GDP per 
capita growth, inflation and volatility.  In the estimation of the inflation model we use an 
unbalanced panel data for 169 countries, during 1971-1998.  For the growth model we 
used two panel data sets:  The first one comprised of five year averages; the second data 
set is a panel with yearly data.  Finally, for the volatility model we use averages of five-
year periods to calculate the standard deviation of GDP growth.
17 
The empirical treatment effects model may be written as follows:    
 
(1)        y j t =  x j t β  + γ  δ j + µ j t 
 
 
                                                           
17 Volatility of GDP growth is measured as the standard deviation of growth in sub-periods of five years. 
The sub-periods correspond to the years 1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993 and 1994-1998. 
Accordingly, the covariates were averaged out for the same sub-periods. The union, ICU and dollarized 
dummies where set to one for a particular sub-period if the country belonged to the respective group for at 
least four of the five sub-period years. In particular, Equatorial Guinea belongs to the CFA union only since 
1985, but it was assigned a value of 1 for the ICU (and the union) dummy for the sub-period 1984-1988. 
On the contrary, even though Liberia was dollarized till 1981, it was not considered a dolarized country for 
the sub-period 1979-1983 (it was neither included in the control group). On the other hand, the West 
African Currency Union was dissolved in 1980, so Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are not considered as part 
of an ICU (nor as part of the control group) for the sub-period 1979-1983.   11
                                   1,    if    δ * j t   > 0 
(2)       δ j t   =        
                       0,     otherwise 
 
(3)     δ * j t =    w j t α   + ε  j t . 
 
Equation (1) is the macroeconomic performance equation, where y j t stands for each of 
the macroeconomic outcome variables of interest in country j and period t; x j t is a vector 
of covariates that capture the role of traditional determinants of economic performance; δ 
j t is a dummy variable (i.e. the treatment variable) that takes a value of one if country j in 
period t is “common currency” country, and zero if the country has a currency of its own. 
Accordingly, γ  is the parameter of interest: the effect of the treatment on the outcome. 
The decision to have a common currency is assumed to be the result of an unobserved 
latent variable δ* j t, described in equation (2).  δ* j t, in turn, is assumed to depend linearly 
on vector w j t.  Some of the variables in w j t may be included in x j t  (Maddala 1983, p. 
120).
18 β  and α  are parameters to be estimated. µ j t  and ε  j t are error terms assumed to be 
bivariate normal, with a zero mean and a covariance matrix given by: 
 
         σ   ς 
(4)          ς 1   
 
If the performance and common currency equations are independent, the covariance term 
ς in equation (4) will be zero.  Under most plausible conditions, however, it is likely that 
this covariance term will be different from zero. 
  Greene (2000) has shown that if equation (1) is estimated by least squares, the 
treatment effect will be overestimated.  Traditionally, this problem has been tackled by 
estimating the model using a two-step procedure (Maddala 1983).  In the first step, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
18   It is assumed, however, that δ * j t does not depend on y j t.  Otherwise, as discussed below, the model 
cannot be identified.   12
treatment equation (2) is estimated using probit regressions.  From this estimation a 
hazard is obtained for each j t observation.  In the second step, the outcome equation (1) 
is estimated with the hazard added as an additional covariate.  From the residuals of this 
augmented outcome regression, it is possible to compute consistent estimates of the 
variance-covariance matrix (4).  Instead of the traditional two-stage method, in this paper 
we use a more efficient maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the model in 
equations (1) through (4) jointly.
19  As shown by Greene (2000), the log likelihood for 
observation k is given by equations (5) and (5’): 
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The model in equations (1) – (4) will satisfy the consistency and identifying 
conditions of mixed models with latent variables if the outcome variable y j t is not a 
determinant (directly or indirectly) of the treatment equation -- that is, if y is not one of 
the variables in w in equation (3).
20 For the cases of per capita GDP growth and volatility 
this is a reasonable assumption.  Although the level of GDP per capita may affect the 
probability of having a common currency, its rate of change, or the second moment of its 
rate of change is unlikely to have an impact on the decision of having a domestic 
currency. This consistency and identifying restriction is also met in the case of the 
inflation model.  Indeed, in every one of the countries in our sample, the decision to use a 
common currency can be traced historically to variables that are structural in nature, 
including the country’s size and its cultural and political relation with the anchor country. 
Moreover, what may affect the decision of being dollarized is the propensity to have a 
                                                           
19   The two-steps estimates yield similar results, and are available from the authors on request.   13
high inflation rate.  This propensity, however, is indeed captured by some of the variables 
in the wj t vector in equation (3). However, in order to check for the robustness of the 
results obtained from the estimation of the model in equations (1) through (5), in section 
V we present results obtained from the instrumental variables estimation of a treatment 
effects model for inflation. 
In the estimation of the model (1)-(5) we also impose some exclusionary 
restrictions; that is, a number of the wj t covariates included in equation (3), are not 
included in the outcome equation (1). These exclusionary restrictions are not required for 
identification of the parameters, but they are generally recommended as a way of 
addressing issues of collinearity.
21 
III.2  Basic Results for Common Currency Countries as a Group 
In this section we report the results obtained from the estimation of the treatment 
effects model given by equations (1) through (4).  The “treatment group” is defined as 
all countries without a currency of their own.  That is, the dummy variable δ t j takes a 
value of one if in period t country j does not have a domestic currency; no distinction is 
made, at this point, between strictly dollarized and ICU countries – see, however, the 
results in section IV.  The data set covers 1970 through 1998, and includes 199 counties 
and territories.  The number of observations varies, depending on the outcome variable 
considered.  There are 3,122 observations on inflation and 5,233 observations on growth 
per capita.  When using 5 years averages – both in the growth and volatility models – the 
panel has 950 observations.
22   
III.2.1  The Treatment Equation 
In a highly influential article, Mundell (1961, p. 181) argued that the “optimum 
currency area is the region.”  By this he meant that regional considerations – 
geographical proximity and the existence of factor mobility, among other – were more 
important than national (or sovereign) considerations in determining optimal currency 
areas.  This regional-based approach has been present in most subsequent work on the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 Details on identification and consistency of models with mixed structures can be found in Maddala 
(1983).  See, also, Heckman (1978), Angrist (2000) and Wooldridge (2002). 
21 Wooldridge (2002). 
22   Remember that the volatility variable is measured as the standard deviation of growth over a five year 
period.  When alternative 7-year periods were used, there were no significant changes in the results.   14
subject of optimal currency areas.
23  Following Mundell’s insight, we include a number 
of “regional variables” in our empirical analysis on the probability of being a “common 
currency” country.  More specifically, in the specification of the treatment equation (3), 
we included the following covariates that encapsulate the importance of the “region:”  (a) 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the economy in question is an 
independent nation, and zero if it is a territory.  Since factor mobility is much lower 
across independent nations than between a dependent territory and the “home country”, 
we expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative in the estimation of equation (3). 
(b) A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country in question is an island or 
archipelago.  Since island-archipelago countries are relatively isolated, they tend to be 
self-contained regions. We expect this variable to have a negative coefficient in (3).  And 
(c), a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country has a common border 
with a nation whose currency is defined, by the IMF, as a “convertible currency.”  We 
call this variable “border,” and we expect its estimated coefficient to have a positive sign 
in equation (3).  In addition to these regional variables
24, the following covariates were 
also included in the specification of the treatment equation (3):  (d) the log of population 
measured in millions of people, as an index of the country’s size. We expect the 
estimated coefficient of this variable to be negative, indicating that larger countries are 
less likely to use another nation’s currency.  (e) The log of initial (1970) GDP, taken as a 
measure of the country’s economic size.  We also expect the coefficient of this variable to 
be negative.  (d) An indicator of the degree of openness of the economy.  For the majority 
of countries and years we used the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index.   We used 
data from a variety of sources to supplement the Sachs-Warner index for those countries 
and years not covered in their sample.
25  As Frieden (2003) has argued, its estimated 
coefficient is expected to be positive.
 And, (g) a variable that measures the (log of the) 
distance between each country and global markets; in defining this “distance variable” we 
followed Leamer (1999).  We expect its estimated coefficient to be positive indicating 
                                                           
23 See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) for a recent discussion on the subject. 
24 Unfortunately, there are no available data on other regional variables of interest, including a generalized 
index of factor mobility or of synchronicity of shocks, for all countries in our sample.  
25   See the original Sachs-Werner (1995) article for a specific list of requirements for a country to qualify 
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that countries that are less integrated to world markets will have a lower probability of 
being common currency countries.   
III.2.2  The Outcome Equations 
We specified (and estimated) three different models, for (a) GDP per capita 
growth, (b) inflation, and (c) growth volatility.  A difficulty we faced in undertaking this 
analysis is that many “common currency” countries have limited data availability.  For 
instance, very few of the strictly dollarized countries have data on education attainment 
or on some other variables traditionally included in growth empirical analyses (Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin 1995, Barro, 1996).  Indeed, popular data sets, such as the World Bank 
WDI, the IFS or the Barro-Lee (1996) data set, include data on only a handful – three or 
four – strictly dollarized countries.  Nevertheless, and after searching in a number of 
alternative data sources, we were been able to include a number of covariates in the 
outcome equations (1) for per capita growth, inflation and volatility.
26   
In the estimation of the GDP growth model we included, as customary, initial 
GDP, a measure of openness, a variable that captures the country’s geographical location, 
regional dummies (no dummies were included for Asia, which is defined as the reference 
region),
27 and the “common currency” dummy.  As Sachs (2000), among others, has 
argued, countries located close to the equator tend to grow more slowly, after controlling 
for other factors, than nations in other parts of the world.  Our geography variable -- 
which we call “tropics”-- is defined as the (normalized) absolute distance from each 
country to the equator.  We expect its coefficient to be negative, capturing the fact that, 
with other things constant, countries closer to the tropics will tend to grow at a slower 
rate than countries in other geographical areas.
28  
In the inflation model, in addition to the common currency dummy, we included 
openness, lagged inflation (as a measure of persistence), inflation lagged twice, the 
tropics geography variable, distance and the regional dummies.  Finally, in the volatility 
model we include the following covariates in the outcome equation:  initial GDP, 
openness, the regional dummies and the common currency dummy.  As in the other 
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27   These variables are expected to capture the effect of some of variables for which there were no data. 
28 See Leamer (1997) and Venables (2002) for discussions on the role of geography and distance on 
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models, in some of the specifications we introduced regional variables.  In the volatility 
model we expect that the estimated coefficient of both openness and initial GDP will be 
negative.    
III.2.3  Results 
In Table 3 we summarize the results obtained from the estimation of the treatment 
effects model for GDP per capita growth.  Table 4 contains the results for inflation, and 
Table 5 those for growth volatility.  Each of these tables contains two panels.  The upper 
panel includes the results from the outcome equation; the lower panel contains the 
estimates for the “treatment equation.”   
Probability of Being a Common Currency Country:  As may be seen from these 
tables, the results are similar across models and are quite satisfactory.  The vast majority 
of the coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  They clearly indicate that the probability of being a “common currency” country 
is higher for very small, not independent countries (or territories).  Being an island 
reduces the probability of having a common currency; as does greater distance from 
world markets.  The estimated coefficient of “border” is not significant at conventional 
levels and has a negative sign – see, however, the discussion in Section IV.
29   
GDP per Capita Growth:  In Table 3 we present the results obtained from the 
estimation of the growth model.  We report results from six systems:  the first three were 
estimated using annual data, while the last three were estimated using five year averages. 
As may be seen, the traditional regressors have the expected signs and are significant at 
conventional levels.  In terms of the monetary regime, these results show that the 
coefficient of the “common currency” dummy is positive and statistically significant for 
all specifications.  Its point estimate ranges from 0.749 to 1.204.  This suggests that, 
during the period under consideration, and after controlling for other factors, countries 
with a “common currency” regime experienced a higher rate of growth of GDP per capita 
than countries with a currency of their own. These results suggest that the growth 
advantage of “common currencies” countries amounted, on average, to approximately 1 
                                                           
29  In addition to the variables in tables 3-6, we considered additional covariates.  In particular, we 
constructed an index on whether the country in question was a member of a “deep” trading area.  This 
index, however, identifies almost fully the “common currency” countries, reducing the spirit of the 
analysis.    17
percentage point per year.  Notice that these results are quite different from the simple 
means differences reported in Table 2:  while according to those results there have been 
no differences in average rates of growth across the two groups of countries, the 
estimates in Table 3 indicate that common currency countries have grown at a 
significantly faster rate than countries with a currency of their own.  The chi square test 
for the independence of the treatment and outcome equations indicates that in all 
specifications the null hypothesis of independence across the equations is rejected at 
conventional levels.
30 
Inflation:  The results for the inflation model are reported in Table 4.  As may be 
seen from the “outcome” equation in the upper panel, the “common currency” dummy is 
negative and significant in every one of the specifications.  The point estimates range 
from –11.99 to –14.43, not only confirming that inflation has historically been lower in 
the “common currency” countries, but also indicating that the “common currency” 
advantage is somewhat larger than what the simple mean differences results reported in 
Table 2 suggest.  The other covariates in the inflation regressions reported in table 4 have 
the expected signs, and are statistically significant.  In particular, these results indicate 
that more open countries have lower inflation, as do countries that are geographically 
closer to the global markets.  Inflation appears to have some degree of persistence, and 
the regional dummies indicate that, relative to the benchmark (Asia), Latin America and 
Africa have had a significantly higher rate of inflation.  As the χ  
2 statistics show, the null 
hypothesis of independent equations is rejected at conventional levels.  In order to 
investigate the robustness of these results, and to deal with potential endogeneity 
problems, we also estimated the inflation model using an instrumental variables treatment 
approach.  The results are presented in Section V.   
Volatility: Table 5 contains the results for the volatility models.  The null 
hypothesis of independent equations is rejected at conventional levels -- the χ  
2 statistics 
range from 29.0 to 34.7 – and the dummy variables for “common currency” are 
significantly positive, indicating that countries without a domestic currency have 
experienced a higher degree of growth volatility than countries with a currency of their 
                                                           
30  An important question is whether these results – as well as those in tables 4-5 – are subject to an 
“omitted variables” bias, stemming from the fact that there are no data on some of the traditional regressors   18
own.  Openness reduces volatility – a result that is in line with a number of theoretical 
results in international economics.
31  In addition, our estimates indicate that, after 
controlling by other factors, countries that are closer to the equator have exhibited a 
higher degree of volatility. Also, countries with a higher initial level of GDP per capita 
have had a somewhat higher degree of volatility (the point estimate of this coefficient is, 
however, rather low).  According to these results, growth in the countries of North Africa 
and the Middle East (MENA) has been particularly volatile.  In what appears to be a 
counterintuitive result, the coefficient for the Europe dummy is positive, although not 
significant.  The reason for this apparent anomaly is that that the Eastern and Central 
European nations are part of the World Bank European region.  Finally, notice that the 
estimated coefficients for the “common currency” dummy are significantly larger than 
the “unadjusted” mean differences in volatility presented in Table 2. 
IV.    Strict Dollarization and Independent Currency Unions:  Is There a 
Difference?  
The results reported in the preceding section grouped all “common currency” 
countries together, implicitly assuming that strict dollarization and ICU are equivalent 
monetary regimes.  This, however, needs not be the case.  As was argued in Section I 
above, there are a number of differences between them, in terms of independence of 
monetary policy, seignorage revenue, and capacity to absorb external shocks.  In this 
section we break up the “common currency” countries into “strictly dollarized” countries 
and ICUs. We then estimate treatment effects models for GDP growth, inflation and 
volatility for each of these two groups separately.
32  The specification of both the 
treatment and outcome equations are similar to those reported in tables 3-5 for the 
“common currency” nations.   
The results for GDP growth are in Table 6.  Those for inflation are in Table 7 and 
those on volatility are in Table 8.  In each of these Tables we report a limited number of 
equations.  The results for alternative specifications were similar, and are available on 
request.  An inspection of the results suggest the following patterns:   
                                                                                                                                                                             
for the common currency countries.  We address this issue in some detail in Section IV of this paper. 
31   See Frenkel and Razin (1987).   19
•  There are important differences in the results for the treatment equation 
for ICU and strictly dollarized countries.  More specifically, the results for 
the probability of not having a domestic currency differ in the following 
respects for these two samples: First, while the coefficient of “border” is 
positive (and significant at either the 5 or 10 percent level) in the “strict 
dollarization” models in Table 7 (Models 1 and 3), it is significantly 
negative in the estimates for the ICU countries (Table 7, Models 2 and 4).  
This indicates that geographical proximity to a “convertible” currency 
nation is only important in determining the probability of being a 
dollarized country.   Second, the coefficient for openness is significantly 
positive, as expected, in the dollarized models (Table 7); it is negative in 
the ICU models.  As we argue in Section V below, the CAF countries 
largely drive this result. These important differences in the probit results 
support the hypothesis that it is not correct to consider – as most authors 
have done until now – the two type of common currency regimes as a 
homogeneous group. 
•  In the GDP growth models, the dummy for “strict dollarization” is never 
significant, indicating that after controlling for simultaneity and other 
factors, there is no discernible difference in growth performance between 
dollarized countries and countries with a currency of their own.   
•  In the GDP growth models, the dummy for “ICUs” is significantly 
positive, with a point estimate ranging from 1.36 to 2.72.  This suggests 
that, with other things given, independent currency union countries have 
grown at a significantlyfaster rate than countries with a currency of their 
own.  Moreover, according to our point estimates the growth effect of an 
ICU monetary regime appears to have been quite large. 
•  In the inflation models the dummies for both the “strictly dollarized” and 
the “ICU” countries are significantly negative, confirming that both type 
                                                                                                                                                                             
32   In doing this we excluded the other “common currency” group from the “with-domestic-currency” 
sample.  That is, the “with-domestic-currency” is strictly made of countries that do have a currency of their 
own.   20
of common currency countries have been able to have a significantly 
lower rate of inflation than the with-domestic-currency countries.  
•  In the inflation models the point estimates for the dummies are quite 
different for the two groups of countries.  In fact, these results suggest that 
the “low-inflation” advantage is greater for the ICU countries.  This 
contrasts with the “unadjusted” comparisons reported in table 2, which 
suggested that strictly dollarized countries had a lower average inflation 
rate than ICU countries.  
•  The results for the volatility model show that the dummies’ coefficients 
are significantly positive for both groups of countries.  This supports the 
idea that super hard peg countries regimes tend to result in higher real 
volatility. 
 
V.   Robustness Analysis and Further Results 
In this section we deal with some extensions, we investigate the robustness of the 
results, we address with potential endogeneity problems in the inflation equation, and we 
inquire on what is behind the results reported above.  
V.1  Non-Parametric Methods 
  It is possible that the specification forms chosen for the outcome equations affect 
the results reported above.  In particular, the linearity of these equations may affect the 
estimates of the “treatment coefficient.”  In order to investigate whether this is an 
important factor, we undertook a non-parametric analysis based on “matching estimators” 
(see Blundell and Costa-Dias 2000). A general advantage of this non-parametric method 
is that no particular specification of the underlying model has to be assumed. Matching 
estimators pair each common currency country with countries from the with-domestic-
currency group.
 33  If the sample is large enough, for each treated (common currency) 
observation we can find, in principle, at least one untreated observation with exactly the 
same characteristics.  Each of these properly selected untreated observations provides the 
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required counterfactual for our comparative analysis.
34  The problem is that under most 
general conditions it is not possible to find an exact match between a treated and 
untreated observation. The matching estimator method focuses on estimating an average 
version of the parameter of interest.
35 That is, the matching estimator consists of 
obtaining the difference in outcome as an average of the differences with respect to 
“similar” -- rather than identical -- untreated outcomes. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
have shown that an efficient and simple way to perform this comparison is to rely on a 
propensity score, defined as the probability of participation or treatment: 
P(x)=Prob(D=1/ x). In our case, this is the probability of a country being a common 
currency country. This reduces a multi-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional 
problem, provided that we can estimate P(x). Instead of matching countries directly on all 
of their characteristics, we can compare countries with similar probability of being a 
common currency country.  An additional advantage of this method is that the estimation 
of the treatment on the treated, is not affected by the lack of data on some of the other 
variables affecting the outcome.  In that regard, then, this method provides us with an 
elegant way of handling potential problems emanating from omitted variables in the 
outcome equations.
36  
In this section we report results obtained from using a simple-average nearest 
neighbor estimator. According to this method, for each treated observation, we select a 
pre-determined number of untreated nearest neighbor(s). The nearest neighbors of a 
particular treated observation i are defined as those untreated observations that have the 
smallest difference in propensity score with respect to i. If we choose to use nn nearest 
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where S is a subset of the support of x given D=1. 
36   This assumes that there are no omitted variables problems in the estimation of the propensity used to 
select the nearest neighbors.   22




=  for the observations that have been selected; for other 
observations we set  ij W =0.  We applied the above method to both one nearest neighbor 
and five nearest neighbors.   
The results we report in Table 9 were obtained using a “multiple treatments” 
procedure that assumes that at any point in time there are two possible (and alternative) 
“treatments:”  (a) a dollarization treatment, and (b) an ICU treatment.  The untreated 
group is comprised of all those countries with a currency of their own.
37  The matching 
results in Table 9 may be summarized as follows: First, we confirm that both type of hard 
peg monetary regimes have resulted in lower inflation than regimes with a domestic 
currency.  Second, the GDP growth estimates confirm that ICU countries have grown at a 
faster rate than countries with a currency of their own; the opposite is the case for 
dollarized countries.  In fact, these results indicate that countries with a dollarized regime 
have grown at a significantly lower rate than countries with a domestic currency.  This 
result contrasts with the regression results reported in Table 7, which suggested that there 
had been no difference in the rates of growth in the two groups.  And third, the estimates 
for volatility indicate that in both hard peg regimes it has been higher than in countries 
with a currency of their own.  These mean differences are only significant when five 
nearest neighbors are used.   
Overall, we interpret the results from the matching exercise as providing broad 
support to the findings reported in the preceding section: countries with both hard peg 
regimes have had lower inflation than countries with a currency; only ICU countries have 
had higher growth; and both hard pegs appear to have had a more volatile real economy 
than countries with a domestic currency. 
V.2    Redefining “Very Rapid Inflation” 
  In our inflationary analysis we excluded countries with extremely rapid inflation, 
or “hyperinflation countries.”  In the estimates reported in tables 4 and 7 the sample 
excluded countries with a rate of inflation in excess of 200% per year It is possible, 
however, that by still allowing highly inflationary countries in the sample, the estimates 
                                                           
37  See Lechner (2002) for a discussion on matching methods with multiple treatments.  The results in Table 
XXX correspond to the case when “no replacement” is allowed in selecting the nearest neighbors in the 
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obtained are being driven by extreme or outlier observations.  In order to investigate this 
issue we re-estimated the inflationary equation under alternative definitions of “extremely 
rapid inflation.”  More specifically, in the alternative estimates we first excluded 
observations with an annual rate of inflation in excess of 100%; we then repeated the 
exercise excluding observations with inflation in excess of 50% per year.   
The results obtained when these new samples were used confirmed those reported 
above, in the sense that inflation is significantly lower in common currency countries.  
Interestingly, however, under these new definitions of very rapid inflations the stability 
advantage of ICU countries appear to be even greater than that reported in section IV. 
V.3  Instrumental Variables Estimation of the Inflation Model 
  The results presented in the preceding sections assumed that the treatment did not 
depend on the outcome variable.
38   That is, in estimating the treatment models in 
Sections III and IV we assumed that the treatment (common currency) dummy was a 
strictly exogenous variable.  It is possible to argue that this assumption is not valid in the 
inflation model; according to this line of argument, countries that choose a common 
currency regime are countries with high inflation rates.  In order to deal with this possible 
source of bias, we also estimated the inflation model using an instrumental variables (IV) 
version of the treatment approach.   
Under general conditions the outcome equation (1) can be re-written as: 
 
(1’)    y =  α  +  γ  δ + x β 0 + δ (x-E(x)) β 1 + e 0 + δ (e 1 – e 0), 
 
where the subscript indicates the value of δ  and e 0 and e 1 are zero mean, normally 
distributed error terms, conditional on X and a set of instruments Z. We assume that the 
treatment depends on the instruments Z, that is, that the vector w in equation (3) contains 
variables that are excluded from the outcome equation and that are orthogonal to the error 
terms. Woodridge (2002) shows that a consistent estimator of γ , even when δ  is 
endogenous, is obtained by a two-step procedure. In the first step we estimate the 
parameters in equation (3) using a probit regression of δ  on X and Z; from this estimation 
we then obtain the hazard for each observation. In the second step we estimate the   24
parameters in (1’) by OLS including the dummy variable, the variables in X, the hazard 
function and the interaction of the dummy variable with X - E(X), where we use the 
sample average of X as an estimate of the expected value. The hazard --estimated using 
the instruments Z-- together with the interaction terms play the role of a control function 
that control for possible selection bias
39.   
  In the estimation of (1’) for inflation, the following instruments were used:  log of 
population, log of initial GDP, an independent dummy, an index of the degree of 
openness, the ‘tropics” variable, the regional dummies, the log of distance, the “border” 
variable, the “island” variable, and the average of inflation in the five years prior to our 
first data point.  The results obtained from this IV treatment model confirm those 
presented in Sections III and IV above.  More specifically, the point estimate of the 
dummy for strict dollarization is –12.9 and was significant.  The dummy for the ICU was 
also significant and its point estimate was –18.8.  The detailed results from these IV 
treatment estimates – not reported here due to space consideration – are available from us 
on request.   
V.4    What is Really Behind these Results?  The Role of the CFA and the ECCA 
  From a policy perspective – and in particular from a “lessons” point of view -- an 
interesting question is whether a specific group of countries is behind the results reported 
in the preceding sections.  We are particularly interested in understanding whether there 
is any pattern behind the results suggesting that, while strictly dollarized countries have 
grown at a rate similar to those countries with a currency of their own, ICU countries 
have grown significantly faster than nations with a domestic currency. In order to 
investigate this issue we analyzed the residuals from our regression analysis, and inquired 
on the characteristics of our ICU data set.   
As may be seen from Table 1, the ICU data set maybe divided into three groups 
of countries:  seven members of the East Caribbean Currency Association (ECCA), 
fifteen members from the CFA Franc Zone in Africa, and countries from different parts 
of the world.  A detailed inspection at the raw data suggests that there are very substantial 
differences in terms of economic growth between the ECCA nations, on the one hand, 
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(2002). 
39 For details on these procedures see Woodridge (2002).   25
and the rest of the ICU countries.  Indeed, for the period under consideration average 
yearly GDP per capita growth in the ECCA countries has been 3.16%.  In the other ICU 
countries, on the other hand, it has only been 0.79%.  The comparison of medians yields a 
similar result, with the median growth for ECCA countries at 3.6%, and that for the rest 
of the ICUs at 0.72%.  This unconditional comparison suggests that the ECCA nations’ 
performance is behind our findings (Table 6) that, with other things given, ICU nations 
grow at a faster rate than countries with a domestic currency.  In order to investigate this, 
we estimated separate treatment effects model for GDP per capita growth for ECCA and 
other-ICU nations.
40  The estimated coefficient for the ECCA common currency dummy 
variable was 2.3, with a t-statistics of 4.46, confirming that ECCA nations have 
outperformed by a wide margin countries with a currency of their own.  The results for 
the non-ECCA ICU countries were quite different, with a statistically insignificant 
estimated coefficient for the treatment dummy of 0.5.
41 These results, then, confirm the 
notion that the driving force behind the apparent superior growth performance of 
common currency countries, reported in the preceding sections, is fully driven by the 
group of seven ECCA nations.  
VI.  Concluding Remarks  
In the aftermath of the currency crises of the 1990s a number of economists have 
argued that the emerging economies should give up their domestic currencies.  
Interestingly, there have been very few systematic comparative studies on the 
performance of countries that, indeed, do not have a currency of their own.  Moreover, 
there has been no effort in the empirical literature to make a distinction between “strictly 
dollarized” countries and “independent currency union” countries.  Most of the literature 
on the subject has, in fact, been based on case studies of Panama, or on indirect 
performance analyses of groups of countries strongly dominated by ICUs.  This lack of 
empirical analyses has resulted in policy debates that, until now, have been based on 
conjectures and not on hard historical evidence.  This has been particularly the case when 
the issue under discussion relate to the merits of “strict dollarization.” 
                                                           
40   In the estimation we had to re-specify the treatment equation.  The reason is that some of the regressors 
(islands, for example) fully predicted the probability of being a currency union country. 
41   These results are from a specification that includes regional dummies in the GDP growth outcome 
equation.  If these dummies are excluded the ICU dummy becomes negative with a t-statistic of –1.46.   26
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze, from a comparative perspective, 
economic performance in economies that don’t have a currency of their own.  We have 
argued that the main difficulty in performing this type of comparison refers to defining 
the correct “control group” with which to compare the performance of the dollarized 
countries.  In this paper we tackled this issue by using the “treatment effects model” 
developed in the labor economics literature; this method allows us to jointly estimate the 
probability of being a “common currency country,” and the effect of having this 
particular monetary regime on specific macroeconomic outcomes.  Estimation using this 
technique yields results that are substantially different from those obtained from simple 
comparisons using a large control group of all with-domestic-currency countries.  More 
specifically, we found that both ICU and dollarized countries have had a significantly 
lower rate of inflation than with-currency ones.  We found that macroeconomic volatility 
has been higher in both dollarized and ICU economies, than in with-currency countries.   
We believe that our results are particularly interesting with respect to GDP 
growth.  The estimations reported in Table 6 suggest that while strictly dollarized 
countries have had a statistically rate of GDP per capita growth that is not different from 
that of countries with a currency of their own, ICU countries have grown faster than with 
currency nations.  When we investigated these findings further, we found that the East 
Caribbean Currency Area countries were the driving force behind this estimated ICUs 
superior growth performance.  Indeed, once these seven countries were excluded from the 
sample, we found no statistical difference in GDP per capita growth in the rest of the ICU 
countries and countries with a currency of their own.  The ECCA countries constitute, 
indeed, a very special group:  They are very small indeed, with an average population of 
less than 100,000 inhabitants.  They are all islands, geographically close to major 
markets.  Their main industry is tourism, and they have very close economic and cultural 
ties with the United Kingdom.  We believe that their experience with ICU may not be 
entirely useful for larger countries planning to reform their exchange rate and monetary 
regime.  This does not mean, however, that other emerging nations would not benefit 
from giving up their currencies.  Indeed, as Mundell (1961) argued four decades ago, it is 
perfectly possible that countries with certain characteristics will benefit from giving up 
their currency and either dollarizing or joining a currency union.  In that regard the   27
experiences of Ecuador and El Salvador -- two recent dollarizers -- will be very useful to 
assess this question in the future. Naturally, the euro experience will provide a wealth of 
information on the consequences of common currencies in advanced nations.     28
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Table 1:  Common Currency Countries With Available Macroeconomics Data 
 
 






















































St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 

























Kenya (Till 1979) 
Tanzania (Till 1979) 




















D: Corresponds to a dollarized country.  We provide in bold either the name of the ICU or the name of the 
country whose currency the “common currency” countries have adopted. 
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TABLE 2 
Inflation, Growth and Volatility in Common Currency Countries 















(A) – (B) 
 
A. All Common Currency Countries versus Control Group 
A. Inflation 
Mean 7.26  16.20  -8.94 
     (-10.13) 
Median 5.30  9.03  -3.73 
     (-11.38) 
B.  Per capita GDP growth 
 
Mean 1.29 1.19  0.10 
     (0.48) 
Median 1.29  1.90  -0.61 
     (-4.01) 
C. Volatility of Growth 
Mean 4.74 4.17  0.57 
     (1.91) 
Median 3.48  2.89  0.59 
     (2.67) 
B. Strictly Dollarized versus Control Group 
A. Inflation 
 
Mean 4.24  16.20 -11.96 
     (-7.92) 
Median 3.58  9.03  -5.45 
     (-13.52) 
C.  Per capita GDP growth 
 
Mean 1.25 1.19  0.06 
     (0.17) 
Median 1.26  1.90  -0.64 
     (-5.06) 
C.    Volatility of Growth 
Mean 4.77 4.17  0.60 
     (1.40) 
Median 3.34  2.89  0.45 
     (1.53) 
a:  Number of observations with data for inflation is 760, of which 249 are strictly dollarized 
and 511 belong to an ICU. There are 1,332 observations with data for per capita growth, of which 526 
belong to strictly dollarized country and 806 to an ICU. 
b:  Number of observations with data on inflation is 2,732 and there are 3,907 observations 
with data for per capita GDP growth. 
*:  Number in parentheses are t-statistics     34
TABLE 2 (cont.) 
 
Inflation, Growth and Volatility  
 



















Mean 8.73  16.20  -7.47 
     (-6.95) 
Median 6.94  9.03  -2.09 
     (-4.08) 
B.  Per capita GDP growth 
 
Mean 1.33 1.19  0.14 
     (0.52) 
 
Median 1.29  1.90  -0.61 
     (-1.63) 
C.    Volatility of Growth 
Mean 4.71 4.17  0.54 
     (1.54) 
 
Median 3.65  2.89  0.76 
     (2.32) 
a:  Number of observations with data for inflation is 760, of which 249 are strictly dollarized 
and 511 belong to an ICU. There are 1,332 observations with data for per capita growth, of which 526 
belong to  strictly dollarized country and 806 to an ICU. 
b:  Number of observations with data on inflation is 2,732 and there are 3,907 observations 
with data for per capita GDP growth. 
*:  Number in parentheses are t-statistics  
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TABLE 3 
Common Currencies and GDP Growth: 
A Treatment Effects Model* 
(Maximum Likelihood)  
 



























TROPIC --  -- 
-3.668 









































































































































       0.115 
(1.57) 
      0.116 
    (1.58) 
0.115 
(1.57)
    0.240 
(1.42) 
    0.241 
(1.43) 









































Number of obs       5233  5233  5233  950  950  950 
LR chi2  5.58  5.70  5.44  3.54  3.54  3.54 
Prob > chi2  0.018  0.016  0.020  0.060  0.060  0.060 
 
*  The upper panel contains the outcome equation.  The lower panel contains the estimation of 
the treatment equation, or equation on the probability of being a “common currency country.”  The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  36
 
TABLE 4 
Common Currencies and Inflation: 
A Treatment Effects Model* 
 









































EUROPE --  -- 
10.226 
(3.88)
LAC --  -- 
10.259 
(8.72)
MENA --  -- 
3.997 
(2.08)
NORTHAM --  -- 
2.546 
(0.80)
SASIA --  -- 
1.974 
(1.03)








































     0.146 
(1.41) 
     0.146 
(1.41) 























Number of obs 3122  3122  3122 
LR chi2  6.75  6.75  6.75 
Prob > chi2  0.027  0.027  0.027 
*  The upper panel contains the outcome equation.  The lower panel contains the estimation of 
the treatment equation, or equation on the probability of being a “common currency country.”  The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  37
 
TABLE 5 
Common Currencies and Growth Volatility: 
A Treatment Effects Model 
 



























EUROPE --  -- 
0.660 
(1.14)
LAC --  -- 
1.021 
(1.01)
MENA --  -- 
2.334 
(4.45)
NORTHAM --  -- 
-0.871 
(-0.81) 
SASIA --  -- 
-1.031 
(-1.49) 








































     0.184 
(1.96) 
     0.186 
(1.36) 























Number of obs 950  950  950 
LR chi2  34.71  28.98  32.99 
Prob > chi2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
*  The upper panel contains the outcome equation.  The lower panel contains the estimation of 
the treatment equation, or equation on the probability of being a “common currency country.”  The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  38
TABLE 6 
Independent Currency Unions, Strict Dollarization, and GDP Growth: 
A Treatment Effects Model 
 
































(3.68) -- -- 













































































































































Number of obs  4707  856  4427  856 
LR chi2  4.16  2.68  3.97  4.23 
Prob > chi2  0.040  0.102  0.050  0.038 
*The upper panel contains the outcome equation.  The lower panel contains the estimation of the treatment 
equation, or equation on the probability of being a “common currency country.”  The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. 
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TABLE 7 
Independent Currency Unions, Strict Dollarization, and Inflation: 
A Treatment Effects Model 
 


























DUMMY  ICU 
-20.970 
(-9.52)  -- 























































     0.146 
(1.41)

















Number of obs  2925  2676 
LR chi2  6.15  4.29 
Prob > chi2  0.02  0.04 
*  The upper panel contains the outcome equation.  The lower panel contains the estimation of the 
treatment equation, or equation on the probability of being a “common currency country.”  The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics.   40
TABLE 8 
Independent Currency Unions, Strict Dollarization, and Volatility: 
A Treatment Effects Model 
 
















DUMMY  ICU 
2.271 
(3.62) -- 















































































Number of obs  855  806 
LR chi2  14.19  14.78 
Prob > chi2  0.0  0.0 
*  The upper panel contains the outcome equation.  The lower panel contains the estimation of the 
treatment equation, or equation on the probability of being a “common currency country.”  The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics.   41
TABLE 9:  Common Currencies, ICUs and Dollarization: 






















































*:  The results reported in this table correspond to the five-nearest neighbors without 
replacement.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 